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Chapter 12
Brentano and J. Stuart Mill 
on Phenomenalism and Mental Monism
Denis Fisette
Abstract This study is about Brentano’s criticism of a version of phenomenalism 
that he calls “mental monism” and which he attributes to positivist philosophers 
such as Ernst Mach and John Stuart Mill. I am interested in Brentano’s criticism of 
Mill’s version of mental monism based on the idea of “permanent possibilities of 
sensation.” Brentano claims that this form of monism is characterized by the identi-
fication of the class of physical phenomena with that of mental phenomena, and it 
commits itself to a form of idealism. Brentano argues instead for a form of indirect 
or hypothetical realism based on intentional correlations.
Keywords Brentano · Stuart Mill · Mach · Positivism · Phenomenalism · 
Permanent possibilities of sensation
This study is about Brentano’s relationship with positivism. This topic has been 
investigated in connection with Comte’s and Mach’s versions of positivism, and it 
has been argued that the young Brentano was significantly influenced by several 
aspects of Comte’s positive philosophy without ever committing himself to its anti- 
metaphysical assumptions.1 But several other aspects of Brentano’s relationship 
with positivism have not been thoroughly investigated; namely, Brentano’s 
1 See Münch, D. (1989), „Brentano and Comte“, in: Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol. 35, phi-
losophiques de Strasbourg, vol. 35, pp.  85–128; Fisette, D. (2019), “Brentano’s lectures on 
positivism (1893–1894) and his relationship with Ernst Mach”, in: F. Stadler (Ed.), The Centenary 
of Ernst Mach, Berlin: Springer, collection Ernst Mach Circle, p. 39–50.
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relationship with the British philosopher John Stuart Mill.2 The young Brentano 
was influenced by several aspects of Mill’s thought and we shall see that the philo-
sophical program that Brentano developed in Würzburg is in many respects similar 
to that of Mill. Several years later, in his lectures on positivism and monism that he 
held in Vienna in 1893–1894,3 Brentano is more critical of Mill’s version of positiv-
ism and the so-called permanent possibilities of sensation. The form of phenome-
nalism that Brentano criticizes in these lectures rests on what he calls “mental 
monism,” which he characterises as the identification of the class of physical phe-
nomena with that of mental phenomena. Brentano argues that this form of monism 
commits itself to idealism, which can be summarized by Berkeley’s classical expres-
sion: esse est percipii. I claim that Brentano argues instead for a form of indirect or 
hypothetical realism, and that his own alternative to mental monism consists in 
replacing the identity relation with that of intentional correlation.
12.1  The Background of Brentano’s Relationship with Mill 
and Positivism
Brentano’s interest in positivism goes back to his first meeting with Friedrich Adolf 
Trendelenburg during his studies in Berlin in 1858–1859.4 Trendelenburg exercised 
a great deal of influence over his intellectual development, not only with respect to 
his knowledge of Aristotle, but also to his apprenticeship in philosophy. This is what 
he will confirm, in 1914, on the occasion of his appointment as a member of the 
Prussian Academy of Sciences:
With Trendelenburg, I shared the conviction throughout my life that philosophy lends itself 
to true scientific treatment, but that it cannot get along with such treatment unless it wants 
to be revived regardless of what was transmitted by the great thinkers of the past. I followed 
his example by devoting several years of my life to the study of Aristotle’s writings, which 
he had taught me to consider, above all else, as an untapped treasure. The same belief that 
there is no real prospect of success in philosophy, unless proceeding in the same way as in 
other scientific fields, has less encouraged me to want to embrace much than to concentrate 
all my strength in some relatively simple tasks.5
2 There are, however, helpful studies on Brentano’s relationship to Stuart Mill: see Haller, R. (1988), 
„Franz Brentano, ein Philosoph des Empirismus“, in: Brentano Studien, vol. 1, pp.  19–30; 
Baumgartner, W. (1989), „Brentanos und Mills Methode der beschreibenden Analyse“, in: 
Brentano Studien, Bd. 2, pp. 63–78.
3 Brentano, F. (1893–1894), Vorlesungen: Zeitbewegende philosophische Fragen, Houghton 
Library: Harvard, LS 20, pp. 29366–29475; hereinafter referred to as Lectures on positivism.
4 In his book Seiendes, Bewußtsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz Brentano (Freiburg, 
Alber, 2001, p. 144), M. Antonelli rightly pointed out that most German positivists at the time, 
notably Ernst Laas, who supervised Benno Kerry’s dissertation on the problem of causality in 
Stuart Mill, were students of Trendelenburg.
5 Brentano, quoted in M. Antonelli, Seiendes, Bewußtsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz 
































This conviction led Brentano to take an interest in positivism, and it is also at the 
heart of the research program which he developed in Würzburg.
In 1869, he published an article entitled “Auguste Comte and positive philoso-
phy,” in which he praises the merits of the French philosopher whom he describes 
as “one of the most remarkable thinkers of [the 19th century]”.6 Brentano’s interest 
in Comte and positivism is not limited to this article. He also held a public lecture 
on Comte in 1869,7 and it is known that Brentano’s paper was only the first of a 
series of seven articles that he planned to write on Comte’s philosophy, a project 
which he never carried out. Nevertheless, many issues discussed by Brentano in this 
article on Comte were already at the heart of his philosophical preoccupations when 
he assumed his position at Würzburg in 1866; namely, his philosophy of history, his 
urging of the employment of the inductive method of the natural sciences in phi-
losophy, and his critique of speculative philosophy. Besides these themes common 
to Brentano and Comte, several other factors should also be considered in this con-
text. Notable among these are the classification of sciences that took on increasing 
importance for Brentano during this early period, and the question of religion – 
more specifically, the question of the compatibility of philosophy practised in the 
spirit of the natural sciences with one form or another of theism.8
One of the decisive factors explaining why Brentano took an interest in Comte’s 
philosophy is without a doubt the importance he granted to British empiricism, and 
especially to John Stuart Mill’s philosophy. It was through Mill’s work on Comte’s 
positivism that Brentano came to know about the work of the French philosopher, 
and his reading of Comte had been deeply influenced by Mill’s interpretation of 
Comte’s philosophy in that work.9 But there is reason to think that Mill’s position 
with regard to Comte’s positivism in that work is also, for Brentano, a non- negligible 
motivation for his interest in Mill’s philosophy. We know from Stumpf that 
Brentano’s interest in Mill’s philosophy can be traced back to his first lectures on 
metaphysics, delivered at Würzburg from 1867 (until 1872), in which he dealt abun-
dantly with Mill’s System of Logic.10 Stumpf also confirms that Brentano’s interest 
6 Brentano, F., „Auguste Comte und die positive Philosophie“, in: Kraus, O. (Ed.) (1968), Die vier 
Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand, Hamburg: Meiner, pp. 99–100.
7 Concerning Brentano’s 1869 public lectures on Comte and positivism, see Stumpf, C., 
“Reminiscences of Franz Brentano”, in: McAlister, L. (Ed.) (1976), The Philosophy of Franz 
Brentano, London: Duckworth, p. 20.
8 See Brentano, F. (1873), „Der Atheismus und die Wissenschaft“, in: Historischpolitische Blätter 
für das katholische Deutschland, vol. 72, pp. 852–872 & pp. 917–929.
9 Mill, J. St. (1865), Auguste Comte and Positivism, in: Mill, J. St., Collected Works of John Stuart 
Mill, Robson J. M. (Ed.) (1969), Toronto: University of Toronto Press, vol. X, pp. 261–368.
10 Beside Stuart Mill’s work on Comte, Brentano deals extensively with Stuart Mill’s System of 
Logic in several lectures, namely in his 1869 lectures on deduktive und induktive Logik, and in 
Brentano’s Psychology (Brentano, Psychology from an empirical Standpoint, trans. A. C. Rancurello 
et al., London: Routledge, 1973; hereinafter referred to as Psychology) where he repeatedly refers 
to Stuart Mill’s contribution to the classification of acts, the laws of association, and introspection. 
Brentano further discusses Mill’s logic in a talk delivered in Vienna in 1890 under the title “Modern 
errors concerning the knowledge of the laws of inference” (in D. Fisette & G. Frechette (Eds.), 































in Comte’s philosophy goes hand in hand with the increasing importance of British 
philosophy in Brentano’s research and teaching during the Würzburg period.11 
Indeed, Marty and Stumpf have pointed out significant changes in Brentano’s phi-
losophy toward the end of the 1860s, including changes in the definition of psychol-
ogy in its relation to metaphysics. Brentano temporarily dissociates himself from 
the Aristotelian conception of psychology as a science of the soul, and distinguishes 
more clearly the field of psychology from that of metaphysics. We can even speak 
of a turning point in Brentano’s thought, which began during this period, and which 
is reflected in his rapprochement with the research program developed by philoso-
phers like John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte, for example, and based on a phi-
losophy from an empirical point of view. This stands out clearly from the comparison 
of Brentano’s work on Aristotle’s De Anima in 1867, which contains virtually no 
reference to contemporary psychology, as Brentano’s first lectures on psychology 
were delivered at Würzburg between 1871 and 1873. It is on these lectures that 
Brentano’s Hauptwerk is based, and in which we can observe a rapprochement with 
the British philosophers.12
One of the important sources of information regarding Brentano’s effort to bring 
himself closer to the British empiricists is his correspondence with Mill from 1872 
until the latter’s death in 1873.13 This exchange took place during Brentano’s 
Glaubenskrise, beginning in 1869 with his reflections on Church dogma, and culmi-
nating in his abandonment of priesthood in 1873 and his resignation from his posi-
tion as ordinarius at Würzburg a few weeks later – a position that he had finally 
obtained in May 1872, despite Hoffmann’s opposition, thanks to the intervention of 
Lotze. It is in this state of mind that Brentano prepared to travel to England, and he 
would arrive in London during the summer of 1872 to meet some British 
philosophers.14
In the first letter to Mill, Brentano relates the regrettable state of philosophy in 
Germany, as well as his intention to reform it by drawing on the reform of the natu-
ral sciences. He describes himself as elated by the realization that his own ideas are 
close to those of Mill in many respects regarding the method and certain of his 
Themes from Brentano, Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 513–524) in which he opposes the neo-Kantian 
conception of the rules of inference to that of Stuart Mill.
11 This is also confirmed by A. Marty in his short biography of Brentano where he notes Brentano’s 
increasing interest, during the Würzburg period, in philosophers such as Locke, Hume, Bentham, 
Stuart Mill und Jevons (Marty, A. (1916), “Franz Brentano. Eine biographische Skizze”, in: 
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, 1, Halle: Niemeyer, pp. 97–103.
12 Stumpf, C., „Reminiscences of Franz Brentano“, op. cit. p. 37.
13 Mill, J.  St., The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill, 
1849–1873, Mineka Francis E. and Lindley Dwight N. (Eds.), Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1972, vol. XVII, part IV.
14 It is known that Brentano had planned to teach a course on the theme “inductive and deductive 
logic with an application to the natural sciences and to the sciences of mind” in the summer semes-
ter of 1873, but this course was never given because, in the meanwhile, Brentano resigned from his 


































doctrines.15 Brentano tells him about his plans to travel to England, and this 
 correspondence deals largely with the planning of a meeting between the two phi-
losophers. However, we know that this meeting never took place, first because Mill 
was no longer in London during Brentano’s stay, and second, because a later meet-
ing, intended to take place at Avignon, was unfortunately prevented by Mill’s pass-
ing.16 This does not mean that the British philosopher was uninterested by the young 
Brentano’s work, as the correspondence itself demonstrates the contrary. A review 
of George Grote’s work on Aristotle,17 in which Mill comments of one of Brentano’s 
two works on Aristotle18 which he had sent to Mill in 1872, also indicates the latter’s 
interest in Brentano. The passage concerns Brentano’s habilitation thesis and shows 
Mill’s high esteem for him:
Franz Brentano’s work The Psychology of Aristotle, In Particular His Doctrine of the Active 
Intellect, which M. Grote does not seem to have considered as he wrote his essay because 
Brentano’s work was recently published in 1867; without taking position on the question of 
determining whether Brentano has supported all his theses in that work, the author of the 
present article cannot help but noting that this work is one of the most meticulously exe-
cuted pieces of philosophical research and exegesis that he has ever encountered.19
Mill’s glowing remarks on Brentano gives us an idea of the philosophical scope that 
such a meeting between both philosophers might have had.20
12.2  Mill’s Permanent Possibilities of Sensation
The major influence of Comte and British empiricism on Brentano’s thought has 
recently given rise to interpretations of his philosophy as a version of phenomenal-
ism. We owe the first interpretation to P. Simons in his introduction to the English 
translation of Brentano’s Psychology (p. XVI), in which he attributes to Brentano 
what he called “methodological phenomenalism.” Simons’s interpretation has been 
taken over recently by Tim Crane who claims that this form of phenomenalism is 
15 Worth mentioning in this regard is Brentano’s ethics which has been strongly influenced by 
Mill’s and Bentham’s utilitarianism. See Chisholm, R. (1986), Brentano and Intrinsic Value, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
16 Brentano nevertheless meets with other philosophers during his stay in England, notably with 
H. Spencer, with whom he exchanged a few letters that were published in the journal Nachrichten, 
vol. 6, 1995, pp. 7–16.
17 Grote, G., Aristotle, A. Bain/G. C. Robertson (Eds.) (1972), London: John Murray; Mill, J. St. 
(1875), ‘Grote’s Aristotle’, Dissertation and Discussions, London: Longmans, Green, Reader and 
Dyer, vol. IV, pp. 189–230.
18 J. S. Mill, ‘Grote’s Aristotle’, op. cit., pp. 211 & 222.
19 Mill, J. St., ‘Grote’s Aristotle’, op. cit., p. 222.
20 This correspondence also contains a very interesting philosophical discussion on the theory of 
judgment, and notably on Brentano’s thesis of the reduction of categorical judgments to existential 
judgments, which I cannot discuss in this study. Brentano reproduces the relevant excerpts of this 
discussion with Mill in a long footnote to his Psychology (p. 169–171).




























compatible with the thesis that the reality of the external world transcends appear-
ances and phenomena.21 According to the second interpretation, Brentano commit-
ted himself in his Psychology to metaphysical phenomenalism, according to which 
there is nothing beyond phenomena, the reality of the external world being consti-
tuted by mere appearances. We shall see that the methodological link with phenom-
enalism is justified, although the expression “methodological phenomenalism” is 
rather misleading. The term “phenomenology” is perhaps more appropriate given 
Brentano’s extended use of the term phenomenon, and it is well known that many 
psychologists, including his pupil Stumpf, have used it in this way.22 On the other 
hand, despite his sympathy for philosophers such as Comte, Mill, and Ernst Mach, 
for example, who advocate a rather radical form of metaphysical phenomenalism, 
we shall see that there are reasons to believe that Brentano himself never adhered to 
this form of positivism.
Brentano’s reservations with respect to phenomenalism are first formulated in his 
Psychology and later in his lectures on positivism entitled “Contemporary philo-
sophical questions” which he held in Vienna one year before he left Austria and in 
which he extensively discusses several versions of phenomenalism (p. 29417–29426). 
Despite the cursory character of Brentano’s notes, which predominately consist of 
quotes and paraphrases from the main texts of these philosophers on that topic, these 
manuscripts are valuable with regard to Brentano’s position on phenomenalism. He 
carefully examines four versions of positivism and compares Comte’s version to 
Kirchhoff’s on the one hand, and Mill’s version to that of Ernst Mach, on the other 
hand. He claims that Mill’s and Mach’s versions constitute progress over that of 
Comte’s and Kirchhoff’s to the extent that they both take into account the contempo-
rary development of natural sciences and they grant more importance to the field of 
mental phenomena than the other two versions. The first part of these lectures is 
devoted to a comparative study of Comte’s and Kirchhoff’s versions of positivism 
which he at this point clearly repudiates. He then asks whether one should rule out 
any form of positivism or consider any other forms, even if one has to provide them 
with a critical complement. Brentano opts for the second option, and proposes to 
21 According to T. Crane (Aspects of Psychologism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 
what distinguishes Brentano from phenomenalism proper is that Brentano “believes that there is 
something beyond the phenomena, although we can never know it. Nonetheless, this knowledge 
can never come through science; so as far as science is concerned, phenomenalism might as well 
be true. Peter Simons has usefully called Brentano’s approach methodological phenomenalism and 
I will adopt this label,” p. 33.
22 See Fisette, D. (2015), “The Reception and Actuality of Carl Stumpf”, in: D. Fisette/R. Martinelli 


































examine in turn Mill’s doctrine of permanent possibilities of sensation in chapter 11 
of his critical work on Hamilton23 and Ernst Mach’s doctrine of elements.24
Brentano already discussed Stuart Mill’s theory in the first chapter of the second 
book of his Psychology in the context of a revision of his definition of natural sci-
ences. Brentano considers certain restrictions to his definition of the natural sci-
ences as sciences of physical phenomena because the phenomena of imagination, 
for example, which are ultimately physical phenomena, are not objects of study of 
the natural sciences. It is in this context that he proposes this definition of the natural 
sciences as the
sciences which seek to explain the succession of physical phenomena connected with nor-
mal and pure sensations (that is, sensations which are not influenced by special mental 
conditions and processes) on the basis of the assumption of a world which resembles one 
which has a three-dimensional extension in space and flows in one direction in time, and 
which influences our sense organs.25
Brentano claims that this form of explanation further presupposes that one ascribes 
to the world “forces capable of producing sensations and of exerting a reciprocal 
influence upon one another, and determining for these forces the laws of co-exis-
tence and succession.26 In a footnote to this passage, he associates this notion of 
force with what Mill calls “permanent possibilities of sensation,” even if he claims 
that the notion of physical phenomenon ultimately refers to “the external causes of 
sensation” that are manifest in sensations.27
This explanation does not coincide entirely with Kant’s premises, but it approaches as far 
as possible his explanation. In a certain sense it comes nearer to J. S. Mill’s views in his 
book against Hamilton (Chap. 11), without, however, agreeing with it in all the essential 
aspects. What Mill calls “the permanent possibilities of sensation,” is closely related to 
what we have called forces.28
What Brentano says immediately after this passage regarding the task of natural 
sciences and their object (forces) does not seem to be entirely in agreement with his 
understanding of Mill’s doctrine in his 1893–1894 lectures. For he says explicitly in 
this passage that these forces belong to a spatial world, a true effective world, which 
is exactly what Mill disputes with his doctrine of the permanent possibility of 
23 Mill, J. St. (1865), An examination of Sir William Hamilton’s philosophy, and of the principal 
philosophical questions discussed in his writings, London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts & 
Green, 1865; He introduced the concept of permanent possibilities of sensation in chapter 11 
entitled “The psychological theory of the belief in an external world”.
24 Mach,E. (1991), Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis des Physischen zum Psychischen, 
6e ed., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft; see Brentano, Über Ernst Machs 




28 Psychology, p. 76 n.

































sensations, as we shall see later.29 Be that as it may, Brentano concludes this brief 
commentary on the definition of the natural sciences by saying that this definition is 
justified to the extent that it was conceded from the outset that
the external causes of sensations correspond to the physical phenomena which occur in 
them, either in all respects, which was the original point of view, or at least in respect to 
three-dimensional extension, which is the opinion of certain people at the present time. It is 
clear that the otherwise improper expression ‘external perception’ stems from this 
conception.30
Twenty years after the publication of his Psychology, Brentano is much more criti-
cal of Mill’s philosophical positions. In his lectures on positivism, Brentano under-
stands Mill’s book on Hamilton as an attempt to explain our belief in an external 
world in terms of beliefs in permanent possibilities of sensation. The following 
quote summarizes Mill’s working hypothesis in this chapter of his book on Hamilton:
The conception I form of the world existing at any moment, comprises, along with the 
sensations I am feeling, a countless variety of possibilities of sensation; namely, the whole 
of those which past observation tells me that I could, under any supposable circumstances, 
experience at this moment, together with an indefinite and illimitable multitude of others 
which though I do not know that I could, yet it is possible that I might, experience in cir-
cumstances not known to me. These various possibilities are the important thing to me in 
the world. My present sensations are generally of little importance, and are moreover fugi-
tive: the possibilities, on the contrary, are permanent, which is the character that mainly 
distinguishes our idea of Substance or Matter from our notion of sensation.31
Mill claims to account for the common sense belief in the existence of a real world, 
of a substance, by reducing it to such permanent possibilities of sensations.32 He 
further maintains that our world view contains, in addition to sensations – which are 
fleeting and momentary and which are moments dependent on us – a multiplicity of 
possibilities of sensations which come to us partly from past experiences or obser-
vations, and which indicate that, under certain conditions, one can experience them 
repeatedly. In addition to such possibilities, there are possibilities about which we 
do not know and that we can only imagine or anticipate, for example, and which 
constitute further possibilities. Mill claims in this passage that the main difference 
between the actual sensations and these possibilities is that the latter are permanent, 
and that it is precisely the permanence of these possibilities that distinguishes the 
substance from mere phenomena and sensations.
29 However, in his Lectures on positivism, Brentano argued that Mill, in the second edition of his 
work on Hamilton, recognized the existence of matter and distanced himself from the version of 
phenomenalism that he advocated in the first edition.
30 Psychology, p. 76.
31 Mill, J. St. (1865), An examination of Sir William Hamilton’s philosophy, and of the principal 







































Experience further teaches us that the succession of these sensations is linked to 
a fixed order33 from which we form the relations of cause and effect. This order of 
succession is not between real sensations in experience, but between groups of pos-
sibilities of sensations (of wholes), which seem to us more real than our own sensa-
tions.34 As a special case of a permanent possibility of sensation, Mill uses the 
example of the city of Calcutta.
I believe that Calcutta exists, though I do not perceive it, and that it would still exist if every 
percipient inhabitant were suddenly to leave the place, or be struck dead. But when I anal-
yse the belief, all I find in it is, that were these events to take place, the Permanent Possibility 
of Sensation which I call Calcutta would still remain; that if I were suddenly transported to 
the banks of the Hoogly, I should still have the sensations which, if now present, would lead 
me to affirm that Calcutta exists here and now. We may infer, therefore, that both philoso-
phers and the world at large, when they think of matter, conceive it really as a Permanent 
Possibility of Sensation.35
These possibilities of sensation form the permanent background of one or more of 
these sensations which appear to us to be real at a given moment. According to 
Brentano, the possibilities behave in relation to the real sensations as a cause in rela-
tion to its effects or as matter in relation to form.36
Brentano concludes this analysis by saying that Mill is a pure positivist in the 
sense that he excludes everything that is not psychical phenomena, which is to say 
that “the object of experience is only his own mental phenomena. And so he believes 
that he may not assume anything real than his own psychical phenomena. (…) 
Indeed, only our own mental phenomena deserve the name of facts of experience”.37
This is Brentano’s characterization of Mill’s mental monism: physical phenom-
ena understood as the primary objects of experience are reducible to one’s own 
mental phenomena, and to percepts in the case of sensory perception. For if phe-
nomena are somehow related to experience, then they are necessarily related to 
mental states (sensory perception): Esse est percipii.38 We shall see that Brentano’s 
main criticism of Mach and Mill is based on the fact that they do not account satis-
factorily for the duality in the percept or in one’s state of mind, such as an emotion 
between the feeling and what is felt, or between perceiving and what is perceived. 
According to Brentano, to this duality correspond two classes of phenomena, which 
are bearers of heterogeneous and irreducible properties.
33 Lectures on positivism, p. 29419.
34 Lectures on positivism, p. 29421.
35 Mill, J. St. Ibid.
36 Lectures on positivism, p. 29422.
37 Lectures on positivism, p. 29411.
38 Lectures on positivism, p. 29423.



































12.3  The Case of Pain in Psychology
Let us now examine Brentano’s diagnosis of the form of phenomenalism advocated 
by Mill and Mach, which is based on the amalgam of the class of physical phenom-
ena with that of mental phenomena. In his Psychology, Brentano discusses a similar 
hypothesis in relation to his theory of primary and secondary objects, which he 
attributed to Hamilton, A.  Bain and Mill; it also consists in identifying primary 
objects, i.e. physical phenomena, with secondary objects, i.e. mental phenomena. 
Brentano’s discussion of this hypothesis takes place in the first chapter of the second 
book of Psychology, in which he discusses several criteria for the delineation of the 
class of mental phenomena from that of physical phenomena. It is in this context 
that he introduces the notion of intentional inexistence both as the main criterion for 
this classification and as the main property of mental phenomena. The discussion 
with the English empiricists pertains more specifically to the value of the division in 
the class of phenomena between the subclass of physical phenomena and that of 
psychical phenomena. Brentano argues against phenomenalism on the basis of the 
principles underlying his classification in his Psychology.
Brentano uses Hamilton’s view on affectivity as an example of the position advo-
cated by Mill and the other positivists on that issue. In the following excerpt, 
Hamilton refuses to consider sensations (feelings) of pleasure and pain as mental 
(or intentional) phenomena.
In the phaenomena of Feeling, – the phaenomena of Pleasure and Pain, – on the contrary, 
consciousness does not place the mental modification or state before itself; it does not con-
template it apart, – as separate from itself, – but is, as it were, fused into one. The peculiarity 
of Feeling, therefore, is that there is nothing but what is subjectively subjective.39
Hamilton’s position in this passage rests on the idea that one can be conscious of 
being in a state of pain without representing it (without objectifying it), which is to 
say that the state of pain can be conscious without being about anything, i.e. without 
being intentional, as Stumpf and Husserl also claim. The notion of content can also 
be used to formulate the same opposition. According to the author of Lectures on 
Metaphysics and Logic, an affective state (a feeling) such as pain is subjectively 
subjective because it has no content different from itself, and the state of feeling and 
what is felt are one and the same thing.
Brentano disagrees fully with Hamilton’s analysis, and proposes an analysis of 
pain which is compatible with the basic tenets of intentionalism. He admits that 
macroscopic objects necessarily appear to us as phenomena because the mode of 
donation of an object depends on the way it is determined intentionally, and in this 
sense what is given to consciousness necessarily depends on an act of presentation. 
Thus, the mode of consciousness by which one relates to a physical phenomenon 
belongs to the class of intentional acts which he calls presentations. That is one of 
the principles of Brentano’s Psychology that is at the heart of the dispute with the 











































positivists. It is the principle (Vorstellungsgrundlage) according to which every 
mental state is either a presentation or is based on a presentation.40 This amounts to 
saying that this feeling of displeasure is always “presupposed by a presentation”:41 
no pleasure or pain without a presentation and therefore without an intentional act. 
Unlike Hamilton, Brentano claims that every state possesses a content which is dif-
ferent from itself and which carries properties different from those of mental phe-
nomena, and this content constitutes its primary and immanent object.42
Moreover, in response to an argument of A. Bain, Brentano argues that despite 
the fact that the mode of givenness of physical phenomena, such as colour, for 
example, is dependent upon and relative to the presentation we have of it, that does 
not mean that a colour cannot exist without being presented. Otherwise, being pre-
sented would be a property of colours.43 Brentano only says that “to present,” “to be 
presented” means the same thing as “to appear”.44 Yet one of the properties that 
Brentano attributes to the subclass of physical phenomena is space. In the case of 
the experience of pain, the object presented is the part of the body where pain is 
localized. This is consistent with one of the main features of physical phenomena – 
i.e., that they are always externally perceived as localized.45
Brentano further maintains that all phenomena such as colours convey a similar 
form of duality, and he emphasizes this distinction in the cases of a cut, a burn, and 
a tickle which awaken in us a feeling of pain:
But then in cases where a feeling of pain or pleasure is aroused in us by a cut, a burn or a 
tickle, we must distinguish in the same way between a physical phenomenon, which appears 
as the object of external perception, and the mental phenomenon of feeling, which accom-
panies its appearance, even though in this case the superficial observer is rather inclined to 
confuse them.46
He claims, in fact, that the sensation of pain as any sensation involves the Empfinden-
Empfundene duality, and that we must distinguish, even at this most elementary 
level, the act of experiencing pain, which is a mental phenomenon, from that toward 
which this act is directed, i.e., the physical phenomenon.47
As we can see, one of the fundamental presuppositions in Brentano’s diagnosis 
based on the identification of physical and mental phenomena is that pain and sen-
sory feelings in general are, for the positivists, mental phenomena and intentional 








47 One of the arguments used by Brentano against this identification is linguistic and it is based on 
the equivocity of the German notion of Gefühl which designates both the feeling (Empfinden) and 
what is felt (empfundene) (Psychology, p. 65). Brentano also mentions an argument based on the 
experience of the phantom limb (ibid.).



































justice to their own position, we can introduce a new distinction within the class of 
affective states between sense feelings, which are sensations just like colours and 
sounds, and emotions, which are intentional states like beliefs and desires. The 
essential difference is that emotions but not sense feelings are intentional states. 
This distinction is at the heart of the debate between Brentano and his students 
Husserl and Stumpf. In a sense, the debate that divides Brentano and Mill pertains 
to the question whether the experience of pain belongs to the class of intentional 
states or whether it is a mere sense feeling as sensationalist philosophers such as 
W. James claim.48 Husserl and Stumpf claim that they are two sui generis states, 
while Brentano seems to advocate a form of intentionalism according to which 
intentionality is the unique trait of the mental, and the threshold of conscious experi-
ence is representational and therefore necessarily intentional. This is again con-
firmed by this excerpt from Brentano’s lectures on positivism in which he 
summarizes his position on the relationship between the two classes of phenomena:
The sensory feeling (das Empfinden) always has the general characteristic feature of a men-
tal phenomenon, which is characterized as an intentional relation to an immanent object. It 
can be found similarly in memorising, desiring, enjoying, recognizing, negating, etc. 
However, what is felt [in a sensory feeling] has the general character of a physical phenom-
enon, which consists in the fact that the phenomenon is localized.49
12.4  Phenomenalism vs. Indirect Realism
In his book on Comte, Stuart Mill suggests that the adjective “positive” in the 
expression “positive philosophy,” “would be less ambiguously expressed in the 
objective aspect by Phaenomenal, in the subjective by Experiential”.50 Mill’s remark 
brings to the fore two characteristic features of positive philosophy, which Brentano 
insists upon in his article, to wit: first, that it is a philosophy aiming to found itself 
on experience, i.e., on observation and induction, and second, that it ultimately only 
concerns itself with phenomena, and more specifically, with the succession and 
similarity between phenomena, which it subordinates to natural and invariant laws. 
Furthermore, it implies the rejection of research into ultimate causes by which 
Comte characterizes the mode of explanation of phenomena by theistic philosophy 
and metaphysical philosophy in his theory of the three states. In this respect, the 
notion of phenomenon as used by Comte and the positivists is especially important 
to Brentano with regard to its central role in his Psychology, in which it designates 
at once the object of psychology (mental phenomena) and that of the natural sci-
ences (physical phenomena). Brentano relates the use of phenomena in his philoso-
phy to the relativity of knowledge, by which he means both a limitation of our 
48 See Fisette, D., “Mixed Feelings”, in: D.  Fisette/G.  Fréchette (Eds.) Themes from Brentano, 
op. cit. pp. 281–306.
49 Lectures on positivism, p. 29441.







































knowledge of transcendent things and of the relational character of our knowledge. 
A passage from Mill’s work on Comte summarizes this point perfectly:
We have no knowledge of anything but Phaenomena; and our knowledge of phaenomena is 
relative, not absolute. We know not the essence, nor the real mode of production, of any 
fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude. These 
relations are constant; that is, always the same in the same circumstances. The constant 
resemblances which link phaenomena together, and the constant sequences which unite 
them as antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws. The laws of phaenomena are all 
we know respecting them. Their essential nature, and their ultimate causes, either efficient 
or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us.51
According to Brentano, the thesis of the relativity of knowledge does not entail any 
form of scepticism or any metaphysical presuppositions. On the other hand, a phi-
losopher like Hamilton argues that the lack of absolute knowledge and thesis of 
relativity of knowledge testify for metaphysical relativism, i.e. the relativity of the 
existence and reality of the external world to the subject of knowledge:
But the meaning of these terms will be best illustrated by now stating and explaining the 
great axiom, that all human knowledge, consequently that all human philosophy, is only of 
the relative or phenomenal. In this proposition, the term relative is opposed to the term 
absolute; and, therefore, in saying that we know only the relative, I virtually assert that we 
know nothing absolute, – nothing existing absolutely; that is, in and for itself, and without 
relation to us and our faculties. (…) But as the phenomena appear only in conjunction, we 
are compelled by the constitution of our nature to think them conjoined in and by something 
(…) But this something, absolutely and in itself, – i.e. considered apart from its phenom-
ena, – is to us as zero. It is only in its qualities, only in its effects, in its relative or phenom-
enal existence, that it is cognizable or conceivable.52
Hamilton’s characterisation of the relativity thesis in this passage is metaphysical 
since it emphasizes the relativity of the existence of the objects of the outside world 
and not merely an epistemic limitation as does Brentano. And contrary to what 
some commentators of Brentano have recently argued, the adoption of the relativity 
thesis does not necessarily involve metaphysical phenomenalism. Brentano con-
ceived of it as an epistemological limitation related to the extended use of phenom-
ena in philosophy and science. According to Brentano, the phenomena studied by 
sciences, such as sound or heat, do not have any real existence outside observation, 
but are mere phenomena and “signs of something real, which, through its causal 
activity, produces presentations of them”.53 That is why Brentano maintains that we 
cannot claim that the objects of the external perception really are how they seem to 
us, in contradistinction to mental phenomena, the reality of which is guaranteed by 
the evidence of internal perception: “We have no experience of that which truly 
exists, in and of itself, and that which we do experience is not true. The truth of 
physical phenomena is, as they say, only a relative truth”.54 For physical  phenomena 
51 Ibid., p. 6.
52 Hamilton, W., Lectures on Metaphysics, op. cit., pp. 96–97.
53 Psychology, p. 14.
54 Psychology, pp. 19–20.










































give us no representation of the reality to which these phenomena refer, and what 
appears in these phenomena does not truly exist. Brentano further claims that even 
if we had a complete knowledge of the physiology of the brain, for example, this 
could not provide us with more information concerning the true nature of these 
realities; that would only tell us something about certain physical phenomena which 
are caused “by the same unknown X”.55 What Brentano ultimately disputes in this 
case is the mode of explanation of phenomena referring to occult properties or 
obscure causes, i.e., to what Comte in his three laws theory calls the theological and 
metaphysical modes of explanation based on fictitious entities or persons. Brentano 
claims instead that our knowledge is limited to relations between phenomena, more 
specifically relations of succession and resemblance that link phenomena with one 
another and, as we said above, the main task of science consists in formulating laws 
that govern these relations. For instance, when we seek to explain why one body 
attracts another one, we are not looking for an occult entity belonging to the ulti-
mate nature of attraction, but rather we relate phenomena using a law, in this case 
the law of gravitation.56
Despite Brentano’s commitment to the thesis of the relativity of knowledge and 
several other aspects of positivism, he does not endorse the mental monism and 
metaphysical phenomenalism that he closely associates with the identity thesis. 
This clearly stands out in the conclusion to his lectures on positivism: “It therefore 
seems that the proof of the absurdity of the presupposition of an external space 
world on the basis of the identity of the mental and the physical in sensation be a 
complete failure”.57 As most of his students, Brentano advocates instead a form of 
critical or indirect realism which is compatible with the thesis of the relativity of 
knowledge insofar as one understands this form of realism as a form of hypothetical 
realism, as Brentano frequently does in several manuscripts published in Vom 
Dasein Gottes. For example, in these manuscripts he says that the presupposition of 
a real world is a hypothesis: i.e., to quote Brentano, “a hypothesis which makes 
comprehensible with infinitely more probability than any other our physical phe-
nomena and their order.”58
12.5  Final Remarks on Intentional Correlation
I shall conclude this study with a few remarks on Brentano’s option to metaphysical 
phenomenalism based on the identity relation between the two classes of phenom-
ena. In his lectures on positivism, Brentano raises the question as to whether, if one 
admits the irreducible character of these two classes of phenomena, the core of 
55 Psychology, p. 45.
56 Psychology, pp. 116–117.
57 Lectures on positivism, p. 29443.






































Mill’s and Mach’s version of positivism could not be preserved. Brentano answers 
in the affirmative, on the provision that one replaces the identity relation between 
the two classes of phenomena by that of correlativity (Correlativität), which he 
developed in his lectures on descriptive psychology held in Vienna in the late 
1880s.59 In his lectures on positivism, Brentano claims that this idea of correlation, 
broadly understood, is something similar but more appropriate to what John Stuart 
Mill was looking for with his doctrine of permanent possibilities of sensation, and 
Mach with his doctrine of elements.
If there is no identity, in the sensation, between psychical and physical phenomena, another 
relation might be conceivable which would render it inseparable. I mean that of correlativ-
ity (Correlativität). So are cause and effect, bigger and smaller, bride and groom, etc., not 
identical but correlates and as correlates, inseparable. But also seeing green and green seem 
to be correlates.60
As first approximation, the term correlation refers to the bilateral relation of depen-
dence between pairs like cause and effect, larger and smaller, etc. But Brentano’s 
proposal mainly pertains to this class of correlates which he calls intentional corre-
lates (intentionales Korrelat) and which are involved in the relation between these 
two classes of phenomena. Examples of intentional correlates include the pairs 
sensing and sensed, presenting and presented, denying and denied, loving and loved, 
etc. Brentano maintains that what is specific to the class of intentional relations lies 
in the fact that it includes a pair of correlates, of which “only one is real, while the 
other is not.” In his lectures on descriptive psychology, Brentano claims that the 
intentional correlate (intentionales Korrelat) of any intentional state is not some-
thing real.
This notion of intentional correlate is actually at the heart of a recent controversy 
surrounding the so-called orthodox interpretation of Brentano’s theory of intention-
ality advocated by most of Brentano’s students, and more recently by R. Chisholm. 
There is an interesting parallel to be drawn between this controversy and the debate 
on phenomenalism to the extent that the former bears on the orthodox interpretation 
of Brentano’s intentionality thesis as an ontological thesis on the status of the imma-
nent objects of mental phenomena. For what is at stake in both debates is the status 
of primary objects or physical phenomena and the amalgam of primary and second-
ary objects, i.e. the act’s object and its correlate.
Let us first take a look at the debate over intentionality. In a nutshell, according 
to the advocates of the so-called continuist reading of Brentano, the traditional 
interpretation of Brentano’s theory of intentionality in his Psychology conflates the 
primary object with the intentional correlate of mental act (i.e. the secondary object). 
One of the arguments that proponents of the unorthodox interpretation forward is 
based on a passage from Brentano’s Psychology in which he maintains that the 
sound is not a relative concept (i.e., a correlate).
59 Brentano, Deskriptive Psychologie, R.  Chisholm/W.  Baumgartner (Eds.) (1982), 
Hamburg: Meiner.
60 Lectures on positivism, pp. 29443–29444.










































The concept of sound is not a relative concept. If it were, the act of hearing would not be the 
secondary object of the mental act, but instead it would be the primary object along with the 
sound. And the same would be true in every other case, which is evidently contrary to 
Aristotle’s own view. Likewise, we could not think of anything except certain relations to 
ourselves and our thoughts, and this is undoubtedly false.61
Here, the physical phenomenon of sound is considered the primary object of exter-
nal perception, whereas the secondary object is the object of internal perception (or of 
self-consciousness) and it includes, in addition to the primary object, the presentation 
of the sound and the internal perception of the latter. The discontinuists argue that the 
sound heard is not an intentional object but rather its intentional correlate.
Brentano’s argument in this passage can be formalized as follow:62
 1. The sound is the primary object of the act of hearing a sound.
If the sound was a relative concept, then we would have:
 2. The sound (as an object of the act of hearing) is the same as the heard sound.
It would then follow that:
 3. The heard sound is the primary object of the act of hearing a sound.
It would further follow that the actual correlate would be, according to the canonical 
interpretation:
 4. The act of hearing a sound would be the primary object of the act of hearing a sound.
Brentano concludes that the concept of sound is not a relative concept and that the 
second premise must be false because it confuses the primary (ordinary and non- 
dependent) and the secondary (intentional and dependent on its relation to the 
act) object.
According to the proponents of the non-orthodox interpretation, Brentano distin-
guishes, therefore, between the object of an act (the sound “tout court”) and its cor-
relate (the intentional object, the sound heard). From this perspective, Chisholm and 
the adherents to the orthodoxy are wrong to say that the object of an act is a mysteri-
ous entity endowed with a kind of “diminished existence.” However, if the non- 
orthodox interpretation is right in insisting on the distinction between intentional 
objects and correlates, the question arises as to what the status of the objects of 
external perception – i.e., of the physical phenomena, which they sometimes call the 
objects “tout court” – is. For Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects 
pertains primarily to consciousness and it aims at accounting for the fact that in 
hearing a sound, for example, one is not only conscious of the sound, but she is at 
once conscious of being in the state of hearing it as its secondary object. What, then, 
is the bearing of Brentano’s theory on the issue of the distinction between correlate 
and intentional object? Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an object “tout 
court” for Brentano, but only phenomena triggered by distal or proximal stimuli, 
and as we saw above, “forces capable of producing sensations.” And without this 
distinction, it is very difficult to figure out how to conceive of the distinction 
61 Psychology, p. 101.
62 See Sauer, W. (2006), „Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano“, in: Grazer phi-
losophische Studien, vol. 73, pp. 1–26; Fréchette, G., „Brentano’s Thesis (revisited)“, in: Themes 











































between, on the one hand, primary objects of external perception and transcendent 
objects, and on the other hand, intentional correlates and intentional objects. This 
raises several interesting questions about the status of primary objects in Brentano 
that I cannot address here.
Be that as it may, Brentano’s criticism of Mach’s and Mill’s versions of phenom-
enalism seems to support the non-orthodox interpretation of Brentano’s intentional-
ity thesis insofar as both the discontinuist interpretation and these versions of 
phenomenalism commit the same mistake. This seems to be confirmed by a passage 
in Brentano’s Psychology in which he discusses a hypothesis based on the identifi-
cation of primary and secondary objects that he attributes to A. Bain and J. Stuart 
Mill: “This hypothesis assumes that the act of hearing and its object are one and the 
same phenomenon, insofar as the former is thought to be directed upon itself as its 
own object”.63
In any case, once one accepts the validity of the distinction between correlate and 
intentional object and emphasizes the relational character of intentionality in 
Brentano, the rapprochement which has been made at the outset with methodologi-
cal phenomenalism gains plausibility. For it shows that if one excludes the meta-
physical dimension underlying these versions of phenomenalism, not much 
difference remains with Brentano. For example, we saw that Brentano is committed 
to several aspects of positivism, namely, the importance he grants to phenomena, 
relations, the relativity thesis, and to the mode of explanation based on observation 
and induction. This mode of explanation consists, on the one hand, in seeking rela-
tions of succession and similarity that link phenomena to one another, and on the 
other hand, in searching for general laws that govern these relations. This explains 
how Brentano was able to integrate several elements of the positivist program into 
his own without ever committing himself to its metaphysical assumptions.
63 Psychology, p. 94.
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